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Defendants and Appellees Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud submit the 
following Appellees'Brief in the above-referenced proceeding. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellees agree with Appellant's statement of jurisdiction of this case. 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to the appeal are Plaintiff and Appellant J. Pochynok Company, Inc. 
(hereafter "Pochynok"), and Defendants and Appellees Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn 
Smedsrud (hereafter "Smedsruds"). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court properly followed the Supreme Court's mandate on 
remand by making factual determinations necessary to determine that Smedsruds were the 
"successful parties" in this case for the purposes of awarding attorneys fees based upon 
the jury verdict rendered in this matter. 
This issue concerns the trial court's apportionment of costs (including attorneys' 
fees) under Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-17 and 38-1-18. As applicable case law clothes the 
trial court with discretion in this analysis, its decision in this regard is reviewable under 
an abuse of discretion standard - Shupe v. Menlove, 18 Utah 2d 130, 417 P.2d 246 
(1966); AK&R Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 47 P.3d 92 (UT App 2002); Ault v. 
Holden, 44 P. 3d 781 (Utah 2002). 
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2. Whether the trial court properly denied Pochynok's Motion to Set Aside 
Garnishment, for Restitution, and to Reinstate Mechanic's Lien; alternatively, whether the 
trial court's entry of findings and conclusions rendered that Motion moot. 
Smedsrud challenges that this issue was properly preserved incident to this appeal. 
The general question of the propriety of the trial court's garnishment proceeding was 
previously appealed to this court (Appeal No. 20020940), and affirmed by this Court's 
prior decision therein (J. Pochynok Company, Inc. V. Gregory Smedsrud and Louann 
Smedsrud, 2003 UT App 80; P.3d 563, Addendum at No. 1). The issue was not accepted 
for review by the Supreme Court on certiorari - see Supreme Court decision in J. 
Pochynok Company, Inc. V. Gregory Smedsrud and Louann Smedsrud, 2005 UT 39,116 
P.3d 353, Addendum at No. 2. Neither was any review of the garnishment order made 
part of the order on remand - Addendum at No. 2. Accordingly, it was not properly 
before the trial court on remand, and is not properly before this court on appeal. 
To the extent properly appealable, the trial court's ruling on this issue (assuming 
that such ruling may be implied from the findings and conclusions entered - see 
Argument at Point II, below) was not based on "a misunderstanding or misapplication of 
the law", but followed from the carrying out of the Supreme Court's mandate to enter 
findings and conclusions bearing on whether Smedsruds remained the"successful party" 
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at trial. Again, given the court's underlying discretion in determining the "successful 
party" in this action, the trial court's ruling should be viewed for abuse of discretion 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case concerns the construction of a residence in Summit County, State of 
Utah. Smedsruds, as owners, were sued by Pochynok for breach of contract and quantum 
meruit. Pochynok further sought to foreclose the later of two mechanic's liens asserted 
against the Smedsruds' residence. Smedsruds counterclaimed, asserting defective 
workmanship and failure to complete the project. 
The matter was set for jury trial commencing May 21,2002. On May 9,2002, 
counsel for Smedsruds presented Pochynok with an offer of judgment in the amount of 
$40,000 (see Addendum at No. 3 hereto, R 408-410). Pochynok declined the offer, and 
the case proceeded to trial on the claim as pleaded, Smedsrud having paid no portion 
thereof, to Pochynok or its subcontractors, in the interim. 
The case was tried to a jury on May 21 -22,2002. In its case in chief, Pochynok 
initially claimed $81,269.91 in damages (having plead $74,360.51 in its Complaint - R. 
1-6; 200-207); during the course of trial, though, Plaintiff/Appellant was inconsistent in 
the computation of its claim. Defendants, by contrast, presented evidence that they were 
entitled to significant offsets for unearned supervisor fees, work defects and delays. 
Defendants further produced evidence that they had never received a consistent 
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accounting from plaintiff despite nearly three years of negotiations and attempts, 
contradictory and inconsistent claims coming from plaintiff right up to the eve of trial. 
See Defendants' Exhibits D-29 and D-46. Had plaintiff been willing to discuss a 
consistent claim in light of defendants' demands and offsets, the case would not have 
gone to trial; absent a cogent accounting, though, defendants had no choice but to submit 
the matter for a jury to decide. (R. 390-434). 
Following deliberation, the jury returned a verdict (net of offsets) of only 
$7,096.00 for Pochynok. See Addendum at No. 4 (R. 354-355). Pochynok did not appeal 
the jury verdict, nor did it order a transcript of the trial for inclusion in the record herein. 
On May 31,2002, Defendants and Appellees moved the court for an order taxing 
costs and attorneys' fees which they had incurred in the litigation. Plaintiff/Appellant 
J. Pochynok Company opposed the motion of Defendants and Appellees, and filed its 
own motion for an award of costs and fees. Both parties submitted evidence of costs and 
attorneys' fees in the form of affidavits by legal counsel. 
By minute entry dated July 25,2002 (R. 621-622), the trial court granted 
Defendant/Appellees' motion to tax costs and attorneys' fees, and denied 
Plaintiff/Appellant's motion. Judgment upon the verdict was thereupon entered by the 
Court on August 5,2002 as follows: 
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a. Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, 
Inc., and against Defendants Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud, 
jointly and severally, in the amount of $7,076.56, together with interest 
thereon from and after May 22,2002 until paid in full at the contract rate of 
12% per annum. 
b. Judgment was entered in favor of Defendants Gregory and LouAnn 
Smedsrud, jointly and severally, and against Plaintiff J. Pochynok 
Company, Inc., in the following amounts: 
i. $1,906.94, representing Defendants'costs of suit incurred 
priorto May9,2002; 
ii. $48,083.10, representing Defendants' attorneys' fees incurred 
prior to May 9,2002; 
iii. $766.50, representing Defendants5 costs of suit incurred on 
and after May 9, 2002; 
iv. $33,280.00, representing Defendants' attorneys' fees incurred 
on and after May 9,2002; and 
v. Interest was awarded on the foregoing amounts from and after 
May 22,2002 until paid in full, at the contract rate of 12%. 
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The Judgment further denied Plaintiff/Appellant's petition for foreclosure of its 
mechanic's lien against the residence of Defendants/Appellees, holding that 
Plaintiff7Appellant held no right, title or interest therein. See Addendum at No. 5 
(R. 635-640). 
On August 23,2002, Pochynok moved the court for an order altering or amending 
the judgment under Rule 59 (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which was denied by 
order of the lower court on October 7,2002 (R. 629-631). Pochynok filed its Notice of 
Appeal on November 4,2002. By Order dated December 20,2002 (R. 854-855), this 
matter was referred to the Court of Appeals for decision. Following briefing and 
argument, the Court of Appeals issued its decision on November 6,2003 (Addendum at 
No. 1). 
Pochynok petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for certiorari on January 5,2004. 
By order dated March 18, 2004, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the sole issue of 
whether Smedsruds had properly been deemed the "successful parties" at trial for 
purposes of the award of costs and attorney's fees (Addendum at No. 2). On June 1, 
2004, Pochynok submitted its brief on Certiorari. On June 30th, the Smedsruds submitted 
their Brief on Certiorari. On August 2,2004, Pochynok submitted its Reply Brief. 
On June 24,2005, the Supreme Court issued an opinion upholding the Court of 
Appeals' use of the flexible and reason approach in its review of the trial courts 
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determination of the "successful party." The Supreme Court recognized that the trial 
court should have made findings regarding the amounts sought and awarded by each 
party. In addition, the Court indicated that a determination of the successful party under 
§38-1-18 should have occurred before the calculation required under subsection (3) and 
that any attorneys' fee award under subsection (1) should then be included in the 
subsection (3) calculation of whether any offer of judgment was greater than the 
judgment finally obtained at trial. Finally, the Court remanded to the Court of Appeals 
with instruction to remand to the trial court for a factual determination of awards and 
offsets, followed by a ruling of who was the successfiil party under Utah Code Ann. § 38-
1-18(1), and whether an award of attorneys' fees under § 38-1-18(3) was proper. 
Addendum at No. 2. 
On November 15,2005, Pochynok moved the trial court for an order setting aside 
the writ of garnishment previously entered, ordering restitution of garnished funds, and 
reinstating its mechanic's lien (R. 904-912). The trial court, by order dated February 6, 
2006, took Pochynok's motion under advisement and, consistent with the Supreme 
Court's directive, requested Pochynok and the Smedsrud to each prepare and submit 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Both parties submitted proposed 
findings and conclusions. 
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On March 3,2006, the Court signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
submitted by Defendant/Appellees Smedsrud, as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This matter was tried to a jury on May 21 and 22,2002. 
2. J. Pochynok Company Inc. ("Plaintiff) had filed a complaint 
against Gregory Smedsrud and Lou Ann Smedsrud ("Smedsruds") to 
foreclose a mechanic's lien asserted for work allegedly performed to the 
Smedsruds' residence located at 7100 Canyon Road in Summit County, 
State of Utah. 
3. Plaintiffs claims were based upon a Notice of Mechanic's 
Lien filed with the Summit County Recorder's office on October 19, 1999, 
in the amount of $74,360.51, together with interest, $ 100 in costs and 
attorneys' fees. See Exhibit 1 hereto. 
4. Plaintiff had previously filed, and then released, a Notice of 
Mechanic's Lien against Defendants' property on July 26,1999 in the 
amount of $150,000, plus interest, costs and attorneys' fees. See Exhibit 2. 
5. Plaintiff also brought claims against the Smedsruds for breach 
of contract and quantum meruit. 
6. The Smedsruds counterclaimed, asserting defective 
workmanship and failure to complete the project r 
7. Pella Products, Inc. had asserted a crossclaim against 
Smedsrud; this, however, had been dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 
stipulation and prior order of this Court. 
8. In addition, all claims of Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc. 
against Defendants Blaze Wharton Construction, Inc. and Jeffrey Kaiser 
were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure prior to trial. 
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9. At trial, Plaintiff asserted a claim against Defendants in the 
amount of $81,269.91 (exclusive of costs and attorneys' fees). 
10. Plaintiff offered inconsistent calculations, however, for 
money allegedly owed in the computation of its claim. Specifically, 
documentary evidence was introduced at trial showing inconsistent 
demands by Plaintiff for payment. 
11. In addition, evidence was introduced that Plaintiff had filed 
the July 26, 1999 notice of mechanics' lien against Smedsruds' residence at 
a time when significant draw requests had recently been paid. 
12. Smedsruds presented evidence challenging Plaintiffs 
accounting work, and establishing that Plaintiffs claim at trial, and its 
second notice of mechanics' lien, were excessive. 
13. Smedsruds also presented evidence that they were entitled to 
significant offsets for unearned supervisor fees, work defects and delays. 
Specifically, Smedsruds presented evidence that 
a. Paint work had been double charged, resulting in overcharge of 
$23,087.07; 
b. Plaintiff s contractor fee on the paint work overcharged was likewise 
unwarranted, resulting in an overcharge of $2,308.71; 
c. Smedsruds had been subjected to unwarranted delay costs of 
$3,118.75; and 
d. Plaintiffs lien had been overstated, permitting offset in an amount 
equal to twice the overcharge amount, which Smedsruds placed at 
$11,535.96. 
14. Smedsruds further produced evidence that they had never received a 
consistent accounting from Plaintiff despite nearly three years of negotiations and 
attempts, contradictory and inconsistent claims coming from Plaintiff right up to 
the eve of trial. Had Plaintiff been willing to discuss a consistent claim in light of 
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Defendants' demands and offsets, the case would not have gone to trial; absent a 
cogent accounting, though, Defendants had no choice but to submit the matter for 
a jury to decide 
15. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury returned a general verdict 
in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of only $7,076.56. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. With respect to an award of costs and attorneys fees to the 
"successful part / ' in this action, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1), this 
Court is charged with applying a "flexible and reasoned approach" to the parties' 
relative successes in establishing their claims at trial -AK&R Whipple Plumbing & 
Heating v. Aspen Construction, 2004 Utah 47, ffi[ 25-26,94 P.3d 270. 
2. At trial, Plaintiff asserted claims exceeding $81,000; Smedsruds, 
however (1) challenged the propriety of Plaintiff s accounting and claim, and (2) 
asserted an offset claim of $40,050.49, together with accrued judgment interest. 
3. As such, Plaintiff recovered on only a small fraction of its original 
claim, which was reduced by a factor even greater than the dollar amount of 
Smedsruds' claimed offsets. 
4. The trial court found Smedsruds' challenge to Plaintiffs claim, 
coupled with their asserted offsets, more persuasive than Plaintiffs offered 
evidence in support of its claim. 
5. The trial court was further persuaded that, had Plaintiff offered an 
accurate accounting to Smedsruds, trial by jury might have been averted. 
6. Under these circumstances, the court concludes that Smedsruds 
obtained a comparative victory, considering what total victory would have meant 
for each of the parties. 
7. The court further concludes that Smedsruds obtained a full 
percentage of their claimed offsets. 
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8. Accordingly, the court concludes that Smedsruds were the "successful 
party" at trial, for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1). 
9. In light of the foregoing, the court affirms its prior award of costs and 
attorneys fees to Smedsruds, and its prior denial of costs and attorneys fees to 
Plaintiff. 
10. In light of the foregoing, the court likewise reaffirms its award of 
Smedsruds' costs and attorneys fees incurred after May 9,2002, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3), given that Smedsruds' May 9, 2002 Offer of Judgment 
was greater than Plaintiffs actual recovery at trial, with or without an award of 
costs and attorneys fees under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1). 
11. The court therefore reaffirms its judgment upon verdict and order on post-
trial motions entered August 15,2002, as that order and judgment may hereafter be 
supplemented in the amount of any post-judgment costs and attorneys fees 
incurred by Smedsruds as may hereafter be established by affidavit. . . 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 984-992, Addendum at No. 6l. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Smedsruds defer to the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, set 
out at pp. 8-10, above. As stated therein, and in compliance with Rule 24, Utah R. App. 
P., Smedsruds reiterate those facts as follows: 
1. By this action, Plaintiff and Appellant J. Pochynok Company, Inc. sought 
an order of the Court foreclosing a mechanic's lien interest in property located at 7100 
lfThe record does not contain a separate ruling on Pochynok's Motion to Set Aside 
Garnishment, etc., which the Court took under advisement pending submission of 
proposed findings and conclusions. 
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Canyon Road in Summit County, State of Utah, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1, et 
seq. See Plaintiffs Amended Lien Foreclosure Complaint herein (R. 200-208). 
2. Pochyno&s-c^ims were based upon a Notice of Mechanic's Lien filed with 
the Summit County Recorder's office on October 19,1999, in the amount of $74,360.51, 
together with interest, $100 in costs and attorneys' fees (R. 208-402). 
3. Pochynok had previously filed, and then released, a Notice of Mechanic's 
Lien against Defendants' property on July 26,1999 in the amount of $ 150,000, plus 
interest, costs and attorneys' fees (R. 405). 
4. Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim asserted, inter alia, defective 
workmanship and delay damages. See Defendants' Answer to Pochynok's Amended 
Lien Foreclosure Complaint and Counterclaim herein (R. 19-29; 211-218). 
5. This matter was set for trial to a jury commencing May 21,2002. 
& On May 9,2002, Defendants submitted to Pochynok, through its counsel, 
an offer of judgment in the amount of $40,000, tendered pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§38-1-18(3). See Addendum 1 hereto (R. 408-410). 
7. Contrary to Pochynok's groundless, unsupported and false declaration (see 
Appellants' Brief at pages 3 and 5), Smedsrud paid no subcontractors after May 9,2002. 
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8. At trial, Pochynok asserted a claim against Defendants in the amount of 
$81,269.91 (exclusive of costs and attorneys' fees). See Pochynok's Trial Exhibit 26 (R. 
412-431). 
9. During trial, Defendants presented evidence that they were entitled to 
significant offsets for unearned supervisor fees, work defects and delays. Defendants 
further produced evidence that they had never received a consistent accounting from 
Pochynok despite nearly three years of negotiations and attempts, contradictory and 
inconsistent claims coming from Pochynok right up to the eve of trial. R. 390-434. 
10. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury returned a general verdict in 
favor of Pochynok in the amount of only $7,076.56. See Addendum 2 hereto (R. 354-
355). 
11. Prior to and through May 9,2002, Defendants incurred $ 1,906.94 in costs 
and $48,083.10 in attorneys' fees. Affidavit of Ross I. Romero (R. 435-459). 
12. Between May 10,2002 and the entry of judgment, Defendants/Appellees 
incurred $775.70 in costs and $33,280.00 in attorneys' fees. Affidavit of Ross I. Romero 
(R. 435-459). 
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PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS 
Pochynok filed its Notice of Appeal on November 4,2002. By Order dated 
December 20,2002, this Court transferred the matter to the Utah Court of Appeals for 
disposition (Appeal Number 20020940-CA). Oral argument was presented to the Court 
of Appeals on October 16,2003. The Court of Appeal's opinion issued November 6, 
2003, affirming the trial court's rulings in all respects (Addendum 4 hereto). Pochynok 
petitioned for Writ of Certiorari on January 5,2004, granted by Order of this Court dated 
March 18,2004. On June 24,2005 the Supreme Court issued its Opinion remanding the 
case to the trial court to enter more specific findings of facts and conclusions of law as to 
the awards and offsets as well as who was the successful party. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
ly Utah Code Ann. §31-1-17: 
Except as provided in § 3 8-11 -107, as between the owner and 
the contractor, the Court shall apportion the costs according to 
the right of the case 
2. Utah Code Ann. §38-1-18(1): 
Except as provided in § 38-11-107 and in subsection (2), in 
any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter, the 
successful party shall be entitled to recovery a reasonable 
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the Court, which shall be taxed 
as costs in the action. 
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3. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3): 
A party against whom any action is brought to enforce a lien 
under this chapter may make an offer of judgment pursuant to 
Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If the offer is 
not accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the offeree 
is not more favorable that the offer, the offeree shall pay the 
costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the offerer after the offer 
was made. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court in adopting the Smedsruds5 proposed Findings of Facts and 
Conclusion of Law found they were the "successful parties," for purposes of Utah Code. 
Ann. §38-1-18. 
The balancing test mandated by Shupe v. Menlove, 18 Utah 2d 130,417 P.2d 246 
(1966), coupled with the "flexible, reasoned approach" to determining the "successful 
party," as mandated in the case law handed down since that time, dictate that Smedsruds 
were clearly the successful parties in this case. They defeated all but a fraction of 
Pochynok's mechanic's lien claims through assertion of rights of setoff. Moreover, given 
their statutory entitlement to post-May 9 attorneys' fees, the net recovery in the case goes 
in favor of Defendants and Appellees, and renders them the "successful parties" under 
any definition. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINTI 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THE 
SMEDSRUDS WERE THE SUCCESSFUL PARTY IN THIS CASE. 
The Utah Supreme Court's ruling on certiorari herein expressly adopted the 
"flexible and reasoned approach" to determining the "successful party" in a mechanics's 
lien action. It acknowledged, moreover, that the trial court could well conclude, upon 
proper factual findings, that Smedsrads had been the "successful parties" at trial herein: 
"Though [the] insufficiency [of information in the trial court record 
concerning the trial court's inference and conclusions] requires that we 
direct the court of appeals to remand this case to the trial court for a 
determination of awards and offsets, it does not necessarily follow, as 
Pochynok contends, that Pochynok is the successful party. Our difficulty is 
with the trial court's process, not necessarily the outcome. After a 
determination of the awards and offsets likely considered and made by the 
jury, it is entirely possible that the trial court might once again conclude that 
the Smedsrads are the successful party. 
Addendum at No. 2, p. 6. 
On remand, the trial court accepted the assignment to enter findings and 
conclusions concerning "the awards and offsets likely considered and made by the jury", 
and concluded - again - that under the "flexible, reasoned approach" articulated by the 
Supreme Court in its order of remand, Smedsrads were the "successful parties". 
Addendum at No. 6. While much of what follows is repetitive of prior briefing in this 
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case, it established once again the propriety of the trial court's compliance with the 
Supreme Court's mandate herein. 
A. Attorneys' Fees Incurred After May 9.2002. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3) provides as follows: 
A party against whom any action is brought to enforce a lien 
under this chapter may make an offer of judgment pursuant to 
Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If the offer is 
not accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the offeree 
is not more favorable that the offer, the offeree shall pay the 
costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the offerer after the offer 
was made.2 
The language of 38-1-18(3) is mandatory.3 By making their offer of judgment of $40,000 
on May 9,2002, Defendants/Appellees became statutorily entitled to a recovery of all 
costs and attorneys' fees incurred after that date if Plaintiff/Appellant, as lienholder, 
failed to recover more than the amount of the offer at trial. It is undisputed that 
Plaintiffs/Appellant's recovery, net of offsets asserted by Defendants/Appellees, was 
only a fraction of the offer amount. Without more, then, Defendants and Appellees were 
statutorily entitled to an award of costs in the amount of $775.70, and attorneys' fees in 
the amount of $33,280,00. 
2
 Rule 68, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, permits the extension of an offer of 
judgment at any time more than 10 days prior to the commencement of trial. 
3
 That an award of attorneys' fees is a matter of right where provided by statute or 
contract, see Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44. 
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B. Attorneys' Fees Incurred Prior to May 9.2002. 
On remand, the trial court acted well within its discretion in determining, under a 
totality of circumstances, that Smedsruds were the "successful parties" at the trial of this 
matter, and awarding costs and fees under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the term "successful party" for purposes of 
award costs and attorneys' fees, must be viewed in light of two separate statutory 
provisions, which have been interpreted to complement each other. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-1-18(1) provides as follows: 
Except as provided in § 38-11-107 and in subsection (2), in 
any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter, the 
successful party shall be entitled to recovery a reasonable 
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the Court, which shall be taxed 
as costs in the action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-1-17, however, reads as follows: 
Except as provided in § 38-11-107, as between the owner and 
the contractor, the Court shall apportion the costs according to 
the right of the case 
In the case of Shupe v. Menlove, 18 Utah 2d 130,417 P.2d 246 (1966), the Utah Supreme 
Court was faced with a case in which (precisely as in the case before the Court in this 
action) a building contractor sought to foreclose a mechanic's lien claim against a 
property owner pursuant to a cost-plus-ten-percent building contract. There, as here, the 
jury had returned a verdict in favor of the contractor, but for substantially less than the 
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amount of the contractor's mechanic's lien claim or the amount asserted at trial. The trial 
court rejected the contractor's claim that he had been the "successful party" at trial. This 
Court affirmed. In its opinion, the Court quoted the language of § 17 and 18 of the 
Mechanic's Lien Statute set out above, and then stated the following: 
It is plain that these two sections relating to this subject 
should be construed together and that when attorney fees are 
awardable thereunder, they are to be treated as costs, which, 
as expressed in 38-1-17 the Court 'shall apportion the cost 
according to the right of the case.' 
417P.2dat249. 
More recent cases are in accord. Pochynok has cited AK&R Whipple Plumbing & 
Heating v. Guy, 47 P.3d 92 (UT App 2002), for the proposition that a "successful party" 
in a mechanic's lien action must be determined by a mechanical, winner-take-all, net-
recovery rule. Contrary to this argument, though, the Whipple decision stands for the 
proposition that a trial court's determination of who is the "successful (or prevailing) 
party" is not a mechanical process at all (unless all claims run one way only); that, where 
claims in a civil action run both ways and both parties are to a degree successful, the court 
must adopt "a flexible and reasoned approach," taking into consideration the practical and 
substantive outcome of the litigation. In fact, the court's opinion, while determining that 
"successful party" and "prevailing party" were synonymous terms, expressly noted that: 
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we do not suggest that whether a claim is ultimately 
determined to be enforceable under the conditions of Section 
38-1-18 is not a factor to be considered in determining which 
party or parties prevail or are successful. 
(47P.3dat95.) 
The Whipple decision, moreover, expressly invoked and affirmed the Court of 
Appeals' decision in Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Ut. 
Ct. App. 1990), the holding which expressly validates the Court's ruling in this action. 
In Occidental, the plaintiff brought a trust deed deficiency action against the Defendant, 
seeking also an award of costs and attorneys' fees (in that case under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-1-32). The trial court observed that, of its six-figure deficiency claim, the plaintiff 
recovered only $7,339.44. Based thereon, the trial court determined that, even though 
plaintiff obtained a judgment against Defendants, they were the "prevailing parties" by 
reason of the nominal amount thereof, and awarded them costs and attorneys' fees. The 
court of appeals affirmed: 
At trial, Occidental obtained a judgment of approximately 
$7300. It argues that a money judgment in its favor entitles it 
to attorneys' fees as the prevailing party. As stated above, this 
court has recognized the need for a flexible and reasoned 
approach to making determinations of who is the prevailing 
party. . 
In the case at hand, Occidental claimed a balance due of over 
$600,000 resulting from the trustee's sale held in April 1986. 
. . . The Mehrs were successful in defending against 
Occidental's claim for a $600,000 deficiency based on the 
April sale. The Mehrs successfully demonstrated the validity 
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of the December sale, thus the deficiency judgment was for 
the stipulated amount of $7339.44. In light of the 
circumstances involved and the issues contested at trial, the 
trial court did not err in granting the Mehrs attorneys' fees 
and costs as the prevailing party. 
791 P. 2d at 222. In Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Savings, then, as in the instant case, the 
trial court sustained an award of attorneys' fees to a party which successfully defeated all 
but a token amount of the opposing party's claim. Occidental directly defeats the claim 
of Plaintiff in this action to the effect that any award of a money judgment automatically 
entitles the recipient to the status of "prevailing party," and to an award of attorneys' fees 
as a matter of law. Rather, the Court must look to the realities of the case, and adopt the 
Court of Appeals' "flexible and reasoned approach" to an award of attorneys' fees. 
Under the Occidental/Nebraska decision, as affirmed in Whipple, the Court's ruling in 
this action should stand. 
Finally, the "flexible and reasoned approach" dictated by Occidental and Whipple 
was affirmed and expanded in the recent Utah Supreme Court decision of R.T. Nielson 
Company v. Cook 2002 UT 11,2002 Utah LEXIS 16 (Utah 2002): 
As the court of appeals noted in Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, determining the prevailing party 
for purposes of awarding fees can often times be quite simple. 
783 P.2d 551, 555 (Ut 1989). Where a plaintiff sues for 
money damages, and plaintiff wins, plaintiff is the prevailing 
party; if defendant successfully defends and avoids adverse 
judgment, defendant has prevailed. Id. This simple analysis 
cannot always be employed, however 
750687v2 22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Which party is the prevailing party is an appropriate question 
for the trial court. This question depends, to a large measure, 
on the context of each case, and, therefore, it is appropriate to 
leave this determination to the sound discretion of the trial 
court. We therefore review the trial court's determination as to 
who was the prevailing party under an abuse of discretion 
standard. Appropriate considerations for the trial court would 
include, but are not limited to, (1) contractual language, (2) 
the number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc., 
brought by the parties, (3) the importance of the claims 
relative to each other and their significance in the context of 
the lawsuit considered as a whole, and (4) the dollar amounts 
attached to and awarded in connection with the various 
claims. Based on these and other relevant factors, the trial 
court is in a better position than we are as an appellate court 
to decide which party is the prevailing party. In most cases 
involving language similar to the contractual language before 
us here, there can generally be only one prevailing party. 
[Citations omitted] However, the standard articulated above 
will permit a case-by-case evaluation by the trial court, and 
flexibility to handle circumstances where both, or neither, 
parties may be considered to have prevailed. 
2002 Utah Lexis at 25. 
In this action, the "right of the case" plainly dictated that Defendants and 
Appellees Gregory and Louann Smedsrud be deemed the "successful parties" for 
purposes of an award of costs and attorneys' fees, and the trial court so found. Under the 
R.T. Nielson standard, as well as that in Occidental and Whipple, the trial court's 
determination was clearly the correct outcome, and should not be disturbed. 
Pochynok's recovery on its ever-changing mechanic's lien claim amounted to less 
than 10% of its pleaded claim amount, and barely 8% of its asserted amount at trial. The 
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jury, as trier of fact, must be presumed persuaded that Pochynok's claim was not only 
excessive, but should be all but eclipsed by Smedsruds' claimed offsets. 
It was Pochynok's inability, and unwillingness, to furnish a consistent accounting 
on the project which necessitated adjudication of this matter to begin with. Smedsruds 
tried repeatedly, both before and after completion of the project, to persuade Mr. 
Pochynok to sit down with them and resolve the account. Rather than do so, Pochynok 
simply made repeated demands for payment, the amount of the demand changing each 
time (often several times in the course of only a few days). Not only were the numbers 
inconsistent, but none would acknowledge a single penny of offset for improper work or 
delays. 
The language of Whipple, mandating a "flexible, reasoned approach" to 
determining the "successful party" in attorneys' fee awards has specific application to this 
case, where Smedsruds offered judgment for nearly six times Plaintiffs ultimate 
recovery, and thus became entitled as a matter of law to all attorneys' fees incurred after 
May 9,2002 (the sum total of which far eclipsed Plaintiffs jury verdict). While Whipple 
rejected the strict "net recovery" rule in cases where (as here), both parties realize on 
claims, Smedsruds' statutory entitlement to post-May 9 attorneys' fees clearly dictates a 
net balance in their favor. Certainly, under the "flexible and reasoned approach" 
mandated by Whipple, the court's decision in this case is unassailable. 
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Any practical application of the principles set out in the decision of Shupe v. 
Menlove, dictates that, apportioning costs and attorneys' fees between owners and 
contract "according to the right of the case" dictates that Smedsruds - not J. Pochynok 
Company - were the "successful party/' and should be awarded their costs and attorneys' 
fees. -
As noted above, moreover, J. Pochynok Company filed two successive liens 
against SmedsrudsVAppellees' property in connection with its claims in this matter. The 
first, for $150,000, was released not long after its filing; the second, for some $74,000, 
remained pending through trial. Yet the jury's verdict - clearly applying Smedsruds' 
offset claims - was for just over $7,000 total. Both notices of lien were for amounts far 
in excess of that which J. Pochynok Company was ultimately entitled. The purpose of the 
liens' filing was to secure payment to Pochynok for an amount greater than that actually 
owing. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25, the filing of an excessive lien under the 
circumstances set out above constitutes a misdemeanor.4 It is self-evident that, in taxing 
4
 Since this action was filed, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25 has been amended to 
permit a right of civil recovery for wrongful lien filing. In addition, Utah Code Ann. 
§38-1-18(2) has been added since the filing of this action, statutorily denying to a 
mechanic's lien claimant the right to recover any attorneys' fees whatever in the event 
that its lien filing is adjudged wrongful. While these provisions were not in effect at the 
time Pochynok's notices of mechanic's liens were filed in this action, they plainly 
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costs (including attorneys' fees) "according to the right of the case," as mandated by Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-17 and Shupe v. Menlove, the Court could take into account the fact 
that the mechanics lien which Pochynok sought to vindicate by this action (as well as its 
predecessor) were shown at trial to be excessive, wrongful and illegal on their face. 
Under such circumstances, Smedsruds and Appellees were properly awarded their 
attorneys'fees as the "successful parties." 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO SET ASIDE THE 
GARNISHMENT OF POCHYNOK'S ACCOUNT AND REINSTATE 
POCHYNOK'S MECHANICS LIEN. 
This matter was remanded to the trial court for one purpose only: to enter findings 
and conclusions assessing "the awards and offsets likely considered and made by the 
jury" at trial, in order to revisit the question of whether Smedsruds were the "successful 
parties" at trial (Addendum at No. 2, p. 6). Pochynok's prior challenge to the post-
judgment garnishment of its bank account was unsuccessful before this Court, and was 
not accepted for review under the Supreme Court's writ of certiorari (Id. At p. 1). As 
such, it was not properly before the trial court at all, and not reviewable here. The Utah 
Supreme Court's ruling remanded for a factual determination of awards and offsets, 
codified what was already clear in the law - that the pursuit of excessive mechanic's liens 
is contrary to public policy. 
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followed by a ruling on who is the successful party and (if appropriate) a determination of 
attorney fees. In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the trial Court's use 
of the "flexible and reasoned approach" for determining the successful party. The 
Supreme Court did not instruct the trial court to order the attorneys fees and costs to be 
returned, rather, it sought only clarification from the trial court for its order. Indeed, as 
addressed at length in the Supreme Court's opinion, it expressly rejected Pochynok's 
claim that it was the "successful party," deferring this question to the trial court upon 
more explicit findings of fact. 
There is some question, moreover, whether any final ruling exists in the record on 
Pochynok's motion from which an appeal can be taken. The motion was taken under 
advisement by the trial court's minute entry ruling of February 6,2006 (R. 950), and 
never thereafter addressed on the record of the trial court. The claim, strictly speaking, 
may be unappealable. 
As a practical matter, however, the motion on garnishment issues has been 
rendered moot, for purposes of this appeal, by the trial court's findings and conclusions 
(Addendum at No. 6). An issue on appeal is "moot" whenever the requested relief cannot 
affect the rights of the litigants - State v. Rivera, 954 P. 2d 225 (Utah 1997). At the time 
the motion was made, the trial court had already determined that Smedsruds were the 
"successful parties", entitled to recovery of costs and fees. The trial court's reaffirmation 
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of that finding upon remand mooted any interim claim of impropriety of the garnishment 
proceeding. Given the trial court's proper carrying out of the Supreme Court's mandate 
(with the same result), Pochynok cannot claim injury by reason of the garnishment -
Smedsruds remain entitled to the garnished funds. 
Neither did Pochynok's demand for restitution of garnished funds have merit at the 
time it was raised before the trial court. Pochynok cites the case of Baca v. Hoover, 
Backs & Shearer, 823 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist] 1992, writ denied) to 
support its proposition that garnished funds should be returned to Pochynok. The Baca 
decision, however, presents a very different factual scenario. Therein, a judgment 
underlying a garnishee judgment was dismissed - not remanded for further proceedings. 
Given this situation, the Texas Court of Appeals properly ruled that the garnishment was 
inappropriate: 
A garnishment is not an original suit, but ancillary to the main one, and for 
that reason takes its jurisdiction from the main suit, [citations omitted] 
Thus, when the trial court loses jurisdiction in the main suit by reason of an 
appeal, it likewise loses jurisdiction in the ancillary garnishment 
proceeding, [citation omitted] If the judgment in the main suit is affirmed, 
the trial court regains jurisdiction over the garnishment action. . . if the 
judgment in the main suit is reversed, the garnishment proceedings become 
a nullity and the writs issued thereunder are functus officio* or of no further 
force or authority. 
823 SW.2d at 738 (emphasis added). Smedsruds certainly acknowledge that, given the 
Supreme Court's ruling, the trial Court regained jurisdiction of both the underlying cause 
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of action and the garnishment action. The underlying judgment, however, was not 
reversed and vacated by the remand; rather, the trial Court was charged with the taking of 
further proceedings in the form of factual findings sufficient to sustain its conclusion that, 
in fact, Smedsruds were the "successful party," and entitled to their costs and fees by law. 
Pending that determination, the ancillary garnishment proceeding (of which the trial 
Court likewise regained jurisdiction) was held in abeyance. 
Pochynok's request that the trial Court reinstate its mechanic's lien was and 
remains a mystery. Nowhere in the Supreme Court's opinion was such relief mandated, or 
even implied. Indeed, it seems to contemplate the outcome of the mandated factual 
findings in Pochynok's favor before findings have even been made, an approach which 
the Supreme Court's decision expressly forbad. In fact, Pochynok took no appeal from 
this Court's order releasing its claim of mechanic's lien. Decisions of the trial court from 
which no appeal was taken are preserved and remain in full force and effect, unaffected 
by any portions of the trial court's decision reversed or remanded pursuant to appeal. 
See, Bailey-Allen Company, Inc. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180 (Utah App. 1997) ("any portion 
of a judgment not appealed from continues in effect, regardless of the reversal of other 
parts of the judgment"-945 P.2d at 194). 
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CONCLUSION 
Pochynok's essential argument is simple: He asserted a claim of nearly $100,000, 
yet walked away from trial with a recovery (net of Smedsruds' asserted offsets) of less 
than $8,000. Nevertheless, Pochynok claims, he was the "successful party" simply 
because Smedsruds did not succeed in extinguishing his claim altogether. 
Case precedent from both this Court and the Court of Appeals has long since 
debunked such a mechanical approach to determining who is the "successful party" in 
multi-claim construction litigation. The Utah Legislature has required that costs 
(including fees) be apportioned "according to the right of the case." Case law has 
repeatedly mandated a "flexible, reasoned approach." 
The nature of the claims and counterclaims asserted by the parties, the accounting 
information which was included in the record, and the jury's resulting verdict, paint a fair 
picture: Pochynok severely abused a contractor's legal lien rights in this case, and was not 
successful in vindicating its conduct. This position was supported in the Court entering 
the Findings of Facts and Conclusion of law submitted by the Smedsruds. 
Add to the foregoing the fact of Smedsruds' May 9,2002 offer of judgment, in an 
amount more than five times Pochynok's ultimate verdict, and the trial court's 
discretionary award of attorneys' fees to Smedsruds becomes even more compelling. 
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Based on the foregoing, it is submitted that the Court correctly found the 
Smedsrads were the successful party and that the garnishment was proper as well as the 
denial of Pochynok's mechanic's lien. 
DATED this^) day of July, 2006, 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Rossi. Romero 
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrad 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Gregory SMEDSRUD; Louann Smedsrud; 
Butterfield Lumber, Inc., a corporation; 
Pella Products, Inc., a corporation; et al., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 20020940-CA. 
Nov. 6,2003. 
Contractor brought action against homeowners, 
seeking to foreclose a mechanics* lien and to 
recover for breach of contract, and homeowners 
counterclaimed for breach of contract. The District 
Court, Salt Lake Department, J. Dennis Frederick, 
J., entered judgment for contractor, but awarded 
costs and attorney fees to homeowners. Contractor 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, Associate 
Presiding Judge, held that: (1) homeowners were 
"successful party" and, thus, entitled to award of 
attorney fees and costs, and (2) funds in contractor's 
business account were subject to garnishment. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Mechanics* Liens €=>309 
257k309 Most Cited Cases 
Appellate court reviews a trial court's determination 
as to who was the prevailing party, for purposes of 
determining entitlement to attorney fees, in action to 
enforce a mechanics' lien, under an abuse of 
discretion standard. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-18(1). 
[2] Appeal and Error €==>842(1) 
30k842(l) Most Cited Cases 
Whether an amended statute operates retroactively 
is a question of law, which appellate court reviews 
for correctness without deference to the trial court. 
[3] Appeal and Error €==>1008.1(5) 
30kl008.1(5) Most Cited Cases 
Appellate review of factual findings is highly 
deferential, requiring reversal only if a finding is 
clearly erroneous. 
[4] Mechanics' Liens €=>310(1) 
257k310(1) Most Cited Cases 
Homeowners were "successful party" in contractor's 
action to enforce a mechanics' lien, and thus 
homeowners were entitled to award of attorney fees 
and costs, even though contractor obtained 
judgment for $7,076.56, where contractor did not 
accept homeowners' offer to settle for $40,000, 
contractor recovered only ten percent of amount 
initially sought, and it was reasonable to conclude 
that jury found in favor of homeowners on their 
counterclaims and offset those damages from 
contractor's initial claim. U.C.A.1953, 38-1- 18(1). 
[5] Appeal and Error €=>1024.1 
30kl024.1 Most Cited Cases 
Because prevailing party status depends, to a large 
measure, on the context of each case, the trial court 
is in a better position than an appellate court is to 
decide which party is the prevailing party for 
purposes of determining entitlement to attorney fees. 
[6] Garnishment €=?56 
189k56 Most Cited Cases 
Funds in contractor's business account were subject 
to garnishment, even though contractor intended to 
use such funds to pay subcontractors; use of funds 
was solely in discretion of contractor. 
[7] Banks and Banking C==>154(6) 
52kl54(6) Most Cited Cases 
[7] Banks and Banking €^227(1) 
52k227(l) Most Cited Cases 
There is a rebuttable presumption that the funds in a 
bank account belong to the account owner. 
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Before JACKSON, P.J., BILLINGS, Associate P.J. 
and GREENWOOD, J. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
**1 Pochynok Company, Inc. (Pochynok) appeals 
the trial couif s posttrial order awarding costs and 
attorney fees to Gregory and Louann Smedsrud (the 
Smedsruds) and upholding garnishment of 
Pochynok's account at Zions First National Bank 
over its objections. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
**2 In August 1998, Pochynok and the Smedsruds 
entered into a construction contract wherein 
Pochynok agreed to build a residence for the 
Smedsruds in Summit County and in return the 
Smedsruds agreed to pay Pochynok for his services 
as a general contractor. On January 13, 2000, 
Pochynok filed a complaint against the Smedsruds 
alleging breach of contract arising from the 
Smedsruds1 failure to pay $81,269.91 for services 
rendered. Pursuant to the Utah mechanics' liens 
statute, [FN1] Pochynok sought to foreclose a 
mechanics' lien on the Smedsruds' Summit County 
property to recover the unpaid amounts. The 
Smedsruds counterclaimed for breach of the same 
construction contract alleging defective 
workmanship, delay damages, and failure to 
supervise. On May 9, 2002, pursuant to rule 68 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Code 
Annotated section 38-1-18(3) (2001), [FN2] the 
*565 Smedsruds submitted an offer of judgment in 
the amount of $40,000, which Pochynok did not 
accept. A jury trial ensued in late-May 2002. At 
the conclusion of trial, the jury rendered a verdict 
awarding $7,076.56 to Pochynok. [FN3] 
FN1. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-1 to 29 
(2001 & Supp.2003). 
FN2. In 2001, the Utah Legislature 
amended Utah's mechanics' liens statute to 
include a provision governing offers of 
judgment in mechanics' lien disputes. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3) (2001). The 
amendment became effective on April 30, 
2001, after Pochynok filed its complaint, 
but before the Smedsruds filed their May 
9, 2002 offer of judgment. See id. 
(Amendment Notes). 
FN3. The verdict form does not indicate 
what damages, if any, were awarded to the 
Smedsruds to offset Pochynock's claimed 
damages of $81,269.91. 
**3 Thereafter, both Pochynok and the Smedsruds 
filed posttrial motions claiming to be the 
"successful party" for purposes of the mechanics' 
liens statute, and requesting costs and attorney fees. 
In addition, the Smedsruds asserted that under 
section 38-1-18(3), they were entitled to costs and 
attorney fees incurred after May 9, 2002, because 
Pochynok did not accept the Smedsruds' offer of 
judgment, which was more favorable than the 
subsequent jury award for Pochynok. 
**4 The trial court determined the Smedsruds 
were the successful party under the mechanics' liens 
statute, and accordingly granted the Smedsruds' 
motion to tax costs and attorney fees to Pochynok. 
Concurrently, the trial court ordered Pochynok to 
pay the Smedsruds $49,990.04 in costs and attorney 
fees incurred prior to May 9, 2002, and $34,046.50 
in costs and attorney fees incurred after May 9, 
2002, for a total award of $84,036.54. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1][2] **5 First, Pochynok claims the trial court 
erred in determining the Smedsruds were the 
"successful party" under the amended mechanics' 
liens statute. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1) (2001). 
"We ... review the trial court's determination as to 
who was the prevailing party under an abuse of 
discretion standard." R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 
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2002 UT l l , f 25, 40 P.3d 1119. Pochynok also 
asserts the trial court erred in giving retroactive 
effect to subsection 3 of Utah's mechanics* liens 
statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3). " 
'Whether a[n amended] statute operates 
retroactively is a question of law, which we review 
for correctness without deference to the [trial] 
court.' " State Dep't of Human Servs. v. Jacoby, 
1999 UT App 52,t 7, 975 P.2d 939 (quoting 
Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. State Tax 
Comm'nf 953 P.2d 435,437 (Utah 1997)). 
[3] **6 Finally, Pochynok claims the trial court 
erred in finding Pochynok's business account funds 
were not exempt from garnishment. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 64D(h)(iii). "Appellate review [of factual 
findings] is highly deferential, requiring reversal 
only if a finding is clearly erroneous." Drake v. 
State Indus. Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 
1997). 
ANALYSIS 
I. "Successful Party" Under Section 38-1-18(1) of 
the Mechanics' Liens 
Statute 
**7 As the sole beneficiary of the jury verdict of 
$7,076.56, Pochynok claims to be the successful 
party under Utah Code Annotated section 38-1-
18(1) (2001). Hence, Pochynok argues the trial 
court erred in awarding costs and attorney fees to 
the Smedsruds. Subsection 1 of the mechanics' 
liens statute provides that "in any action brought to 
enforce any lien under this chapter the successful 
party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable 
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall 
be taxed as costs in the action." Utah Code Ann. § 
38-1-18(1). 
**8 Utah courts describe a "successful party" 
under the mechanics' liens statute as the "party in 
whose favor a judgment is rendered ... the 
'prevailing party.' " A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & 
Heating v. Guy, 2002 UT App 73,t 11, 47 P.3d 92 
(Whipple II) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1145 
(7th ed.1999)), cert, granted, 2002 Utah LEXIS 
187, 59 P.3d 603. However, the successful or 
prevailing party "may [be] the party who defended 
against the lien." Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 
876 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (citing *566 
Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 
P.2d 325, 327-28 (1969)); see also Whipple II, 
2002 UT App 73 at J 9, 47 P.3d 92 ("A successful 
party includes, but is not limited to., one who 
successfully enforces or defends against a lien 
action."). 
**9 Utah appellate courts "have addressed 
[various] methodologies for determining which 
party or parties ... occupy prevailing party status" 
under the circumstances of a particular case. 
Whipple II, 2002 UT App 73 at 1 12, 47 P.3d 92. 
Citing to Whipple II, Pochynok contends that the 
trial court should have employed a "net recovery" 
or "net judgment" analysis to determine the 
successful party in this case. Pochynok 
misconstrues our reasoning in Whipple II and 
ignores our holding in that case. The facts 
underlying Whipple II are detailed in A.K. & R. 
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 
1999 UT App 87, 977 P.2d 518 (Whipple I). The 
case involved a plaintiff subcontractor who 
obtained a trial judgment for $3,943.00 and an 
order allowing foreclosure on three mechanics' liens 
against the defendant general contractor. See id. at 
K 1, 977 P.2d 518. Determining the plaintiff was 
the successful party under the mechanics' liens 
statute, the trial court awarded the plaintiff 
$7,500.00 in attorney fees. See id at f 9, 977 P.2d 
518. 
**10 On appeal however, we vacated a portion of 
the trial court's order because the plaintiff was not 
properly licensed to perform some of the work for 
which it obtained judgment. See id. at Iffi 12, 21, 
977 P.2d 518. In light of our disposition of the 
judgment, we also remanded the attorney fees issue 
"for a redetermination of the prevailing party and a 
proper allocation of attorney fees to that party." Id. 
atf40,977P.2d518. 
**11 On remand, the trial court denied the 
plaintiffs claim for foreclosure on the mechanics' 
lien relating to the work the plaintiff was not 
licensed to complete. See Whipple II, 2002 UT 
App 73 at f 5, 47 P.3d 92. Based on the plaintiffs 
resulting net recovery, the trial court determined 
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that the "outcome was essentially a 'draw* " and 
concluded neither party prevailed for purposes of 
awarding attorney fees under the mechanics' liens 
statute. Id. 
**12 On appeal for the second time, the defendant 
argued that because the trial court's calculations on 
remand resulted in a $527.00 net recovery for the 
defendant, the trial court should have awarded the 
defendant attorney fees as the successful party 
under the mechanics* liens statute. See id. at %% 
5-6, 47 P.3d 92. Like Pochynok, the defendant 
argued the trial court's successful party 
determination should have been wholly based on a 
net recovery analysis. See id. at f 10, 47 P.3d 92. 
This court was not persuaded. Noting that "[t]he 
facts and circumstances surrounding a 
determination of prevailing party status vary 
widely," we declared "the 'net recovery rule' is 
[merely] a starting point and need not be applied 
strictly" to every prevailing party determination. Id. 
at f t 18, 20, 47 P.3d 92. We directed Utah 
courts to employ " 'a flexible and reasoned 
approach to deciding in particular cases who 
actually is the prevailing party.' " Id at % 15, 47 
P.3d 92 (quoting Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. 
Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990)). Furthermore, "[a] key part of the 
flexible approach" involves using "common sense" 
to "look[ ] at the amounts actually sought and then 
balanc [e] them proportionally with what was 
recovered." Id. at f 19, 791 P.2d 217. On this 
reasoning we affirmed the trial court's determination 
that neither party was the successful party under the 
mechanics' liens statute. See id. at \ 21, 791 P.2d 
217. 
**13 Two other Utah cases, neither decided under 
the mechanics' liens statute, are instructive. In 
Mountain States Broadcasting Company v. Neale, 
783 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct.App.1989), we applied the 
net judgment rule to determine that a party who 
obtained an $85,000 net recovery-about 60% of the 
amount sought~was the successful party for 
purposes of a contractual fee shifting provision. 
See id. at 556, 558. However, we cautioned that 
when making a successful party determination, a 
trial court should only apply the net judgment rule 
when doing so "does not distort the relative success 
of the parties at trial." Id. at 558. We further 
cautioned that "nothing in our opinion should be 
taken to suggest that the net judgment rule can be 
mechanically applied in all cases." *567 Id. at 557. 
In some cases, we held, the net judgment rule is 
merely "a good starting point" in a much more 
"flexible and reasoned approach to deciding in 
particular cases who actually is the prevailing 
party," id. (quotations omitted), such as "where the 
ultimate award of money damages does not 
adequately represent the actual success of the 
parties under the peculiar posture of the case." Id. 
at 556 n. 7 (citing Owen Jones & Sons, Inc. v. C.R. 
Lewis Co., 497 P.2d 312,313-14 (Alaska 1972)). 
**14 In Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings 
Bank, this court made a prevailing party 
determination in a case arising under Utah's real 
estate conveyances statute. See id. at 221-22 (citing 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1- 24, -32 (1974)). These 
statutes (1) empower a trust deed trustee to sell trust 
property if the trustor breaches a secured obligation 
and (2) award costs and attorney fees to the 
prevailing party in any action to recover the balance 
due upon the obligation for which the trust deed 
was given as security. See id. at 219, 221. In 
Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank, the 
plaintiff brought an action to recover a remaining 
balance of over $600,000. See id. at 222. The trial 
court awarded costs and attorney fees to the 
defendant as the prevailing party because the 
plaintiff recovered only about $7,300 of the 
$600,000 amount at trial. See id. On appeal, the 
plaintiff, like Pochynok, argued the trial court 
should have applied the net recovery rule and 
declared the plaintiff the prevailing party by virtue 
of the jury award in the plaintiffs favor. See id. at 
222. Rejecting this argument, this court applied the 
" 'flexible and reasoned approach' " as outlined in 
the Mountain States Broadcasting Company case. 
See Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank, 
791 P.2d at 221 (quoting Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co., 783 P.2d at 556 n. 7). As such, 
we affirmed the trial court's determination that the 
defendant was the successful party where the 
defendant prevailed on the only contested issue at 
trial-the deficiency amount. See id. at 222. 
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[4][5] **15 We, like the trial judge in this case, 
are persuaded that an application of the net 
judgment rule in the case before us, "distorts] the 
relative success of the parties at trial," Mountain 
States Broadcasting Co., 783 P.2d at 558, and is 
therefore inappropriate. Instead, like the Whipple II 
court, we apply a flexible and reasoned approach. 
See Whipple IIy 2002 UT App 73,fl 19, 21, 47 
P.3d 92. Furthermore, because prevailing party 
status "depends, to a large measure, on the context 
of each case, ... the trial court is in a better position 
than we are as an appellate court to decide which 
party is the prevailing party." R.T. Niels on Co. v. 
Cook, 2002 UT 1 l,f 25,40 P.3d 1119. 
**16 Pochynok initially sought to recover over 
$80,000 from the Smedsruds. At trial, a jury 
determined that Pochynok's claim was only worth 
$7,076.56. Thereupon, the trial court properly 
recognized that Pochynok's action, against which 
the Smedsruds had no choice but to defend, only 
produced a net recovery of approximately 10% of 
the amount Pochynok initially sought. 
**17 Here, the jury's verdict form does not 
provide precise calculations of offsets the jury may 
have made for the Smedsruds' counterclaims for 
faulty workmanship, delay damages, and improper 
supervision. However, from the verdict, the trial 
court could have reasonably inferred such offsets by 
simply subtracting the jury's verdict of $7,076.56 
from the $81,269.91 that Pochynok sought to 
recover in the lien enforcement action. The trial 
court could have reasonably concluded that the jury 
in fact found in favor of the Smedsruds on their 
counterclaims and offset these damages in the 
amount of $74,193.35 from Pochynok's initial claim. 
**18 Furthermore, the mechanics' liens statute was 
amended in 2001 to specify the prevailing party 
where a proper offer of settlement is made. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 39-1-18(3) (2001) (Amendment 
Notes). An examination of the effects of subsection 
3 is relevant to determining who is a successful 
party under section 38-1-18(1). The legislative 
history of subsection 3 indicates as much. Under 
the title, "Penalty for Wrongful Mechanics Lien," 
Senate Bill 167 proposed amendments to three 
sections of the Utah Code: sections 38-1- 18, -25; 
and section 58-55-501, in an effort to curb 
wrongful, outrageous, and fraudulent lien claims. 
See S.B. 167, 2001 Leg., 53d Sess. (Utah 2001). 
*568 A note, proposing the amendment adding 
subsection 3 and speaking to the bill's intent, is 
instructive. 
In my view, the primary inequity in the 
mechanic's [sic] lien law as it currently operates is 
that a party can assert a claim for much more than 
he or she is legitimately owed forcing a defendant 
to litigate the claim, and yet still be entitled to 
attorney[ ] fees as the "prevailing parly" even if 
the lien claimant only recovers a fraction of what 
was originally claimed. 
**19 While the note envisions a simple definition 
of successful party, it is clear the intent of the 
amendment is to discourage outrageous lien claims 
and to encourage the settlement of lawsuits which 
are of minor financial value. Thus, we think the 
trial court's consideration of the refused offer of 
judgment in this case was appropriate in its 
successful party determination. 
**20 Given the potential for a distorted 
determination of the relative success of the parties 
by application of the net judgment rule to the facts 
of this case, we conclude the trial court wisely 
applied a more flexible and reasoned approach to its 
successful party determination. Thus, we conclude 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding 
the Smedsruds were the successful party under the 
mechanics' liens statute and affirm the trial court's 
award of $84,036.54 in attorney fees and costs. 
[FN4] 
FN4. Although we need not reach the 
issue, we would hold that LFtah Code 
Annotated section 38-1-18(3) (2001), 
which was enacted after Pochynok filed its 
complaint in this matter, is procedural and 
thus applies in this case. Therefore, the 
Smedsruds alternatively could recover 
attorney fees from the date of their offer of 
judgment under subsection 3. Subsection 3 
provides: 
A party against whom any action is 
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brought to enforce a [mechanics'] lien ... 
may make an offer of judgment pursuant to 
[r]ule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure [and i]f the offer is not accepted 
and the judgment finally obtained by the 
offeree is not more favorable than the 
offer, the offeree shall pay the costs and 
attorney[ ] fees incurred by the offeror 
after the offer was made. 
Id.§ 38-1-18(3). 
To determine whether an amendment is 
substantive or procedural, we must 
examine whether or not the amendment 
"establishes a primary right and duty which 
was not in existence at the time [the claim] 
arose." Johansen v. Johansen, 2002 UT 
App 75,K 5, 45 P.3d 520 (alteration in 
original) (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
Under the prior version of the statute, trial 
courts were already vested with discretion 
to award costs and attorney fees to one 
party or the other (i.e., the successful 
party) depending on the outcome of the 
dispute. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 
(1997). Thus the amendment merely 
"provid[es] a different mode or form of 
procedure" for courts to employ in 
enforcing previously existing substantive 
rights and duties. Pilcher v. Department of 
Soc. Servs., 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983) 
(deeming a child support enforcement 
statute procedural and giving it retroactive 
effect even though it was enacted ten years 
after the support order); see Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-1-18(3) (2001). Authority from 
other jurisdictions supports a conclusion 
that attorney fee awards are procedural and 
can be applied retroactively. See 
McCormack v. Town of Granite, 913 P.2d 
282, 285 (Okla.1996); Vloedman v. 
Cornell, 161 Or.App. 396, 984 P.2d 906, 
909(1999). 
II. Garnishment 
[6] [7] **21 Pochynok also argues the trial court 
erred in finding the funds in Pochynok's company 
business bank account were not exempt from 
garnishment by the Smedsruds where Pochynok 
claimed the fbnds did not belong to Pochynok. 
[FN5] In Utah, there is a rebuttable presumption 
that the funds in a bank account belong to the 
account owner. See Peterson v. Peterson, 571 P.2d 
1360, 1362 (Utah 1977). Hence, to avoid 
garnishment, a garnishee account owner must show 
by clear and convincing evidence that the funds 
belong to someone else. See id. The record reflects 
that Pochynok requested a hearing to claim an 
exemption to garnishment pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 64(D)(h). However, the record 
also reveals that prior to and during the hearing, 
Pochynok failed to present any evidence to the trial 
court in support of its claim of exemption. With no 
competent evidence to counter the Smedsruds' 
position, the trial court did not clearly err in finding 
the funds were subject to garnishment. [FN6] 
FN5. Pochynok utterly failed to marshal 
the evidence in challenging the trial court's 
factual findings. See West Valley City v. 
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 
(Utah Ct.App.1991). For efficiency, we 
reach the merits of the claim 
notwithstanding. 
FN6. Pochynok argues that the parties put 
on proof by proffer. However, even given 
the proffers made, we conclude the trial 
court did not err. Pochynok's argument 
that the funds in the account were not 
subject to garnishment because those 
monies were intended to be used to pay 
subcontractors on other projects is without 
merit. The funds, once in Pochynok's 
account, were owned by Pochynok. Thus, 
the decision to pay subcontractors with 
those funds, or to use the money 
elsewhere, was solely in the discretion of 
Pochynok. Under these facts no 
constructive trust arises. See Parks v. 
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 599 
(Utah 1983) ("Constructive trusts include 
all those instances in which a trust is raised 
... for the purpose of working out justice in 
the most efficient manner, where there is 
no intention of the parties to create such a 
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relation, and in most cases contrary to the 
intention of the one holding the legal title 
"). 
*569 CONCLUSION 
**22 We conclude that the trial court did not err in 
determining the Smedsruds were the successful 
party under the mechanics' liens statute and 
awarding the Smedsruds attorney fees and costs. 
We also conclude the court did not err in 
determining the funds in Pochynok's company bank 
account were subject to garnishment by the 
Smedsruds. We affirm the trial court's award of 
costs and attorney fees to the Smedsruds and the 
garnishment of Pochynok's company account. 
**23 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON, 
Presiding Judge, PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, 
Judge. 
80 P.3d 563, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 2003 UT 
App 375 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., A 
Corporation, Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v. 
Gregory SMEDSRUD and LouAnn Smedsrud, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 20040005. 
June 24,2005. 
Background: General contractor brought action 
against homeowners, seeking to foreclose 
mechanics1 lien and to recover for breach of 
contract, and homeowners counterclaimed for 
breach of contract. Following a jury trial, the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake Department, J. Dennis 
Frederick, J., entered judgment for general 
contractor, but awarded costs and attorney fees to 
homeowners. General contractor appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, 80 P.3d 563, affirmed. 
Contractor sought certiorari review, which was 
granted. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Durham, C.J., 
held that: 
(1) flexible-and-reasoned approach, not 
net-judgment rule, applied when determining which 
party was "successful party" for purposes of 
awarding attorney fees; 
(2) remand was warranted for purpose of 
determining whether general contractor or 
homeowners were entitled to award of attorney fees; 
and 
(3) as a matter of first impression, determination of 
the "successful party" under statute requiring court: 
to award attorney fees to successful party should 
occur before calculation concerning offer of 
judgment. 
Decision of Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded. 
West Headnotes 
Page 1 
[1] Certiorari C==>64(1) 
73k64(l) Most Cited Cases 
On certiorari, Supreme Court review the decision of 
the Court of Appeals, not the decision of the trial 
court. 
[2] Appeal and Error €==>842(1) 
30k842(l) Most Cited Cases 
When reviewing attorney fee decisions that involve 
questions of law, Supreme Court reviews for 
correctness. 
[3] Appeal and Error €=^842(1) 
30k842(l) Most Cited Cases 
Supreme Court reviews interpretation of statutes for 
correctness. 
[4] Mechanics' Liens €=>310(1) 
257k310(1) Most Cited Cases 
Flexible-and-reasoned approach, not net-judgment 
rule, applied when determining which party was the 
"successful party" for purposes of awarding 
attorney fees in action to foreclose general 
contractor's mechanic's lien, although verdict form 
used by jury gave no indication of whether, or by 
how much, jury offset homeowners' 
breach-of-contract claim against general 
contractor's claim. West's U.C.A. § 38-1-18(1). 
[5] Appeal and Error €^H77(9) 
30k 1177(9) Most Cited Cases 
Remand to trial court was warranted for purpose of 
determining whether general contractor or 
homeowners were entitled to award of attorney fees 
as successful party in action to foreclose mechanic's 
lien; application of flexible-and-reasoned approach 
to determine which party prevailed required more 
information about jury award for general 
contractor's claim and homeowners' 
breach-of-contract claim than was available in 
record. West's U.C.A. § 38-1-18(1). 
[6] Mechanics' Liens €==>310(1) 
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257k310(l) Most Cited Cases 
Determination of "successful party" under statute 
requiring court to award attorney fees to successful 
party in action to foreclose mechanic's lien should 
occur before calculation required under statute 
allowing defendant in mechanic's lien foreclosure 
action to be awarded attorney fees if judgment 
finally obtained by plaintiff is not more favorable 
than defendant's offer of judgment; any attorney 
fees awarded under statute governing award of 
attorney fees to successful parties should then be 
included in calculation of whether offer of judgment 
was greater than judgment finally obtained at trial. 
West's U.C.A.§ 38-1-18(1, 3). 
[7] Statutes €^188 
361kl88 Most Cited Cases 
Supreme Court looks first to the plain language of a 
statute to determine its meaning. 
[8] Statutes €^>190 
361kl90 Most Cited Cases 
Only when there is ambiguity does Supreme Court 
look further than plain language of statute. 
[9] Statutes €==>206 
361k206 Most Cited Cases 
Statutory enactments are to be so construed as to 
render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, 
and interpretations are to be avoided which render 
some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd. 
*354 Ray G. Martineau, Anthony R. Martineau, 
Brett D. Cragun, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Vincent C. Rampton, Ross I. Romero, Salt Lake 
City, for defendants. 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
DURHAM, Chief Justice: 
**1 This case concerns a mechanic's lien and suit 
for breach of contract brought by petitioner J. 
Pochynok Company (Pochynok) against 
respondents Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud (the 
Smedsruds), who counterclaimed for breach of 
contract. We granted certiorari to consider (1) 
whether the court of appeals erred in upholding the 
trial court's determination that the Smedsruds were 
the "successful party" under Utah Code section 
38-1-18(1) when the jury returned only a general 
verdict that did not indicate which party prevailed 
on which claims, and (2) whether Pochynok's 
potential award of attorney fees as the successful 
party should be taken into account under Utah Code 
section 38-1-18(3) when calculating whether the 
Smedsruds' offer of judgment was greater than the 
final judgment ultimately obtained by Pochynok. 
The trial court awarded the Smedsruds attorney fees 
under section 38-1-18(1) as the successful party and 
under section 38-1-18(3) because their offer of 
judgment was greater than the judgment finally 
obtained by Pochynok. The court of appeals 
affirmed. We reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
**2 The Smedsruds hired Pochynok in August 
1998 as the general contractor in charge of building 
their home in Summit County, Utah. In the fall of 
1999, the Smedsruds fell behind in payments to 
Pochynok. In response, Pochynok filed a 
mechanic's lien for approximately $74,000 plus 
interest and attorney fees. Pochynok then brought 
suit against the Smedsruds to foreclose on the lien 
and for breach of contract. The Smedsruds 
counterclaimed, alleging that Pochynok had 
breached the contract through defective 
workmanship and delay in completing construction. 
**3 Twelve days before trial, the Smedsruds made 
an offer of judgment to Pochynok in the amount of 
$40,000 "in complete and final settlement of all 
claims," including "court costs and attorneys' fees." 
Pochynok rejected this offer, and the case 
proceeded to jury trial. At trial, Pochynok asserted 
a *355 claim for $81,269.91, not including costs 
and attorney fees. The Smedsruds, in turn, claimed 
an unspecified amount of offsets and damages for 
unearned supervisor fees and work defects and 
delays. At the conclusion of trial, the jury awarded 
Pochynok a verdict of $7076.56. The verdict form 
used by the jury gave no indication of whether, or 
by how much, the jury offset the Smedsruds' claims 
against Pochynok's claim. [FN1] 
FN1. The verdict form given to the jury 
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allowed it to designate, on one line, the 
amount awarded Pochynok against the 
Smedruds and, on the second line, the 
amount awarded to the Smedruds against 
Pochynok. The jury wrote $7076.56 on the 
first line and left the second line blank. 
**4 The Smedsruds filed a posttrial motion to 
recover costs and attorney fees in the amount of 
$84,036. In support of this motion, they argued that 
under the provisions of Utah Code section 
38-1-18(3), they were entitled to recover attorney 
fees and costs incurred after the offer was made 
because their offer of judgment was greater than the 
judgment finally obtained by Pochynok. In addition, 
they argued that they were the "successful party" 
under Utah Code section 38-1-18(1) and were 
therefore entitled to all costs and attorney fees. 
Pochynok filed its own motion for an award of costs 
and attorney fees in the amount of $39,761, also 
arguing that it was the successful party under 
section 38-1-18(1). 
**5 Despite the jury's award of $7076.56 to 
Pochynok, the trial court ruled that the Smedsruds 
were the "successful party" for purposes of Utah 
Code section 38-1-18(1), denying Pochynok's 
motion and awarding the Smedsruds costs and 
attorney fees in the amount of $84,036.54. Other 
than general references to arguments made by the 
Smedsruds, the trial court's order contained no 
findings of fact or conclusions of law to explain its 
decision. In addition, the court made an explicit 
award to the Smedsruds for attorney fees incurred 
after the date of the offer of judgment, but it did not 
provide a detailed explanation of how section 
31-1-18(3) operated in this case. Pochynok 
appealed. 
**6 The court of appeals upheld the trial court's 
award of costs and fees. J. Pochynok Co. v. 
Smedsrud, 2003 UT App 375, f 1, 80 P.3d 563. 
In doing so, it applied the "flexible and reasoned 
approach," later approved by this court in A.K. & R. 
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen 
Construction, 2004 UT 47, fl 25-26, 94 P.3d 
270, to conclude that the trial court properly 
determined the Smedsruds to be the successful 
party. Pochynok, 2003 UT App 375 at f 15, 80 
P.3d 563. The court of appeals noted that the jury's 
verdict did "not provide precise calculations of 
offsets the jury may have made for the Smedsruds' 
counterclaims" but that the trial court "could have 
reasonably inferred" that the jury awarded the 
Smedsruds $74,193.35 in offsets and could have 
concluded that the Smedsruds were the successful 
party on that basis. Id at f 17. The court of 
appeals did not reach a specific conclusion on how 
to apply section 38-l-18(3)'s offer of judgment rule, 
but approved the trial court's presumed 
consideration of the rejected offer of judgment in its 
successful party determination. Id. at f 20. 
**7 On certiorari, Pochynok argues (1) that 
despite our recent decision in Whipple, the trial 
court and court of appeals should have employed 
the net judgment rule instead of the flexible and 
reasoned approach to determine the successful 
party; (2) that regardless of the rule used, neither 
the trial court nor the court of appeals could have 
properly determined that the Smedsruds were the 
successful party in this action because the jury 
verdict did not provide sufficient information to 
reach such a conclusion, making Pochynok, as the 
only party to receive an award, the successful party; 
and (3) that if Pochynok is determined to be the 
successful party and awarded costs and attorney 
fees pursuant to section 38-1-18(1), this post trial 
award should be considered part of "the judgment 
finally obtained" under section 38-1- 18(3), 
preventing the Smedsruds from receiving postoffer 
costs and attorney fees pursuant to that section. 
[FN2] 
FN2. We do not address the additional 
argument raised by Pochynok regarding 
whether delay damages can be used to 
offset a mechanic's lien. Pochynok cited no 
authority for this proposition, nor is it 
adequately briefed, and we therefore 
decline to address it. See State v. Thomas, 
961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998). 
*356 STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1][2][3] **8 "On certiorari, we review the 
decision of the court of appeals, not the decision of 
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the trial court." Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 
923 P.2d 1389, 1392 (Utah 1996) (internal 
quotation omitted). "When reviewing attorney fee 
decisions that involve questions of law, we review 
for correctness." A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & 
Heating v. Aspen Constr., 2004 UT 47, f 6, 94 
P.3d 270. We use the same standard when 
construing statutes. Id. 
ANALYSIS 
I. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 38-1-18 
A. Subsection (1): Successful Party Determination 
[4] **9 Utah law expressly requires a court to 
award attorney fees to the successful party in any 
mechanic's lien action. Utah Code Ann. § 38-
1-18(1) (2001); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & 
Heating v. Aspen Constr., 2004 UT 47, % 7, 94 
P.3d 270. Section 38-1-18(1) provides that "in any 
action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter 
the successful party shall be entitled to recover a 
reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court." 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1). We most recently 
construed this statute in Whipple, 2004 UT 47, 94 
P.3d 270. Whipple, much like the case now before 
us, involved a mechanics' lien foreclosure action 
and a counterclaim for damages. Id. at f 2. 
Plaintiff Whipple filed a lien for $30,641, with 
defendant Aspen claiming an offset of $25,000 for 
Whipple's allegedly negligent work. Id. at | 3. 
The trial court awarded Aspen $7000 in offsets and, 
"[a]fter calculating the consequences of the parties' 
respective wins and losses on their competing 
claims, ... awarded a net judgment to Aspen in the 
amount of $527." Id. Employing the "flexible and 
reasoned approach" first outlined in Mountain 
States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 
556-57 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (mem. decision on pet. 
for reh'g), the trial court found that, where one party 
received such a small net recovery, the case was 
essentially a "draw," so neither party could be 
considered "successful" for purposes of section 
38-1-18(1). Whipple, 2004 UT 47 at 1 4, 94 P.3d 
270. We upheld both the trial court's use of the 
flexible and reasoned approach and its specific 
finding that there was no successful party. Id. at | 
f 31-32. 
**10 Here, Pochynok seeks to distinguish Whipple 
from the present case and urges us to hold that the 
net judgment rule and not the flexible and reasoned 
approach should apply in cases with general rather 
than specific jury verdicts. Under the net judgment 
rule, the party that receives the bigger judgment is 
the successful party. Since Pochynok received a net 
judgment of approximately $7000, it would be the 
successful party under this rule. Certainly it is more 
difficult-although not impossible~to apply the 
flexible and reasoned approach where, as here, the 
jury verdict does not specify who won what. 
However, it does not follow that the net judgment 
rule automatically applies in such a case. As we 
stated in Whipple, "rigid application of the net 
judgment rule can result in unreasonable awards of 
attorney fees," id at ^ 26, which "would deprive 
trial courts of their power to apply their discretion 
and common sense to this issue," id. at f 25. As in 
Whipple, we decline to require such a rule here. 
[5] **11 At the same time, it is clear that the 
nature of the flexible and reasoned approach 
outlined in Mountain States and Whipple requires 
more information about the jury award for the 
parties' particular claims than is available in this 
case. In Mountain States, the court of appeals first 
considered which party received a net judgment and 
then discussed two additional factors relevant to its 
determination of which party was successful. 783 
P.2d at 558. First, it focused on which party had 
attained a "comparative victory," considering what 
total victory would have meant for each party and 
what a true draw would look like. Id. Second, it 
looked at which party obtained a greater percentage 
of the amount originally claimed. Id. Such an 
analysis in this case is impossible without more 
specific monetary figures. 
**12 Similarly, we stated in Whipple that "[the 
flexible and reasoned] approach requires ... looking 
at the amounts actually *357 sought and then 
balancing them proportionally with what was 
recovered." 2004 UT 47 at \ 26, 94 P.3d 270 
(internal quotation and citation omitted). In the 
present case, because the jury's verdict did not 
indicate specific awards and offsets, the trial court 
did not have the information necessary to undertake 
such a balancing. Nor did the court explain its 
© 2006 ThomsonAVest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
116P.3d353 PageS 
116 P.3d 353,528 Utah Adv. Rep. 34,2005 UT 39 
(Cite as: 116 P.3d 353,2005 UT 39) 
reasoning in concluding that the Smedsruds were 
the successful party. The case before us is thus in 
contrast to Whipple, where we stated: 
Although lacking in detail, the trial court's 
explanation of its rationale is adequate because it 
demonstrates that the court correctly considered 
common sense factors in addition to the net 
judgment. It is apparent from the trial court's 
reasoning that it believed Aspen's net recovery of 
only two percent (2%) of its claimed damages 
was insufficient to make it the "successful party." 
Id. at f 28. In upholding the trial court's 
determination of the successful party, the court of 
appeals inappropriately relied on conjecture, 
surmising that, despite the nonspecific jury award., 
"the trial court could have reasonably inferred ... 
offsets" and "could have reasonably concluded that 
the jury in fact found in favor of the Smedsruds on 
their counterclaims and offset these damages." J. 
Pochynok Co. v. Smedsrud, 2003 UT App 375, \ 
17, 80 P.3d 563. There is nothing in the record to 
indicate that the trial court actually made such 
inferences and conclusions. 
**13 Though this insufficiency of information 
requires that we direct the court of appeals to 
remand this case to the trial court for a 
determination of awards and offsets, it does not 
necessarily follow, as Pochynok contends, that 
Pochynok is the successful party. Our difficulty is 
with the trial court's process, not necessarily the 
outcome. After a determination of the awards and 
offsets likely considered and made by the jury, it is 
entirely possible that the trial court might once 
again conclude that the Smedsruds are the 
successful party. 
B. Subsection (3): Offer of Judgment 
[6] **14 We now consider Pochynok's claims in 
regard to subsection (3) of the mechanic's lien 
attorney fees statute. Utah Code section 38-1-18(3) 
provides: 
A party against whom any action is brought to 
enforce a lien under this chapter may make an 
offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. If the offer is not 
accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the 
offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the 
offeree shall pay the costs and attorneys' fees 
incurred by the offeror after the offer was made. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3) (2001). Pochynok 
argues that if it is held to be the successful party 
under Utah Code section 38-1-18(1), the resulting 
award of attorney fees against the Smedsruds should 
be included as part of the "final judgment obtained" 
pursuant to Utah Code section 38-1-18(3). In other 
words, Pochynok suggests that the determination of 
which party is successful under section 38-1-18(1) 
must be made before a court may determine under 
section 38-1-18(3) whether the judgment finally 
obtained is greater than the offer of judgment. The 
Smedsruds claim the opposite, arguing that an 
award of attorney fees under subsection (3) should 
be included in a determination of which party was 
successful for purposes of subsection (1). 
Subsection (3) was added to section 38-1-18 in 
2001. Its operation in conjunction with subsection 
(1) is a matter of first impression in this court. 
[7][8][9] **15 We look first to the plain language 
of a statute to determine its meaning. Stephens v. 
Bonneville Travel, 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997). 
Only when there is ambiguity do we look further. 
Id. In addition, "statutory enactments are to be so 
construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and 
meaningful, and ... interpretations are to be avoided 
which render some part of a provision nonsensical 
or absurd." Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 
934,936 (Utah 1980). 
**16 In construing section 38-1-18(3), the court of 
appeals held that "the trial court's consideration of 
the refused offer of judgment in this case was 
appropriate in its successful party determination." 
Pochynok, 2003 UT App 375 at 1 19, 80 P.3d 563. 
Bypassing a consideration of the statute's plain 
*358 language, the court of appeals looked to the 
legislative history of subsection (3), noting that it 
was added to the statute in 2001 "in an effort to 
curb wrongful, outrageous, and fraudulent lien 
claims." Id at f 18 (citing ch. 257, 2001 Utah 
Laws 1202). As a result of this clear legislative 
policy, the court of appeals concluded that any 
award of attorney fees under subsection (3) should 
be considered in the determination of which party is 
successful under subsection one. Id. at f 19. In 
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further support of this conclusion, the court quoted 
a legislative note, stating: 
[TJhe primary inequity in the mechanic's lien law 
as it currently operates is that a party can assert a 
claim for much more than he or she is 
legitimately owed forcing a defendant to litigate 
the claim, and yet still be entitled to attorney[ ] 
fees as the "prevailing party" even if the lien 
claimant only recovers a fraction of what was 
originally claimed. 
M a t f l 8 . 
**17 While this statement may accurately reflect 
the policy behind section 38-1-18 in general and 
subsection (3) in particular, we do not agree with 
the analysis of the court of appeals to the extent that 
it overlooks important realities regarding offers of 
judgment. We thus hold that the "judgment finally 
obtained" language in Utah Code section 38-1-18(3) 
includes an award of attorney fees to the successful 
party under section 38- 1-18(1). In other words, if 
the offer of judgment explicitly includes attorney 
fees, [FN3] and turns out to be greater than the 
offeree's jury verdict plus any attorney fees awarded 
to the offeree as the successful party under section 
38-1-18(1), then subsection (3) requires the offeree 
to pay the offeror's costs and attorney fees incurred 
after the offer was made. 
FN3. Although it has no bearing on the 
outcome of this case, we note that, under 
the current version of rule 68 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs 
offers of judgment under section 
38-1-18(3), we would reach the same 
result unless the offer explicitly excluded 
attorney fees. The rule was amended in 
2004 to specifically require that, "[ujnless 
otherwise specified, an offer made under 
this rule ... is an offer to resolve all claims 
between the parties to the date of the offer, 
including costs, interest and, if attorney 
fees are permitted by law or contract, 
attorney fees." Utah R. Civ. P. 68(a). 
**18 The plain language and structure of the 
statute support this interpretation of subsection (3). 
Subsection (3) was added to the end of the 
already-existing section 38-1-18, suggesting it is an 
addition to, and not a starting point for, the required 
analysis under the statute. It also requires 
comparison of the offer of judgment to the 
"judgment finally obtained." Utah Code Ann. § 
38-1-18(3) (emphasis added). This formulation 
implies a finality that cannot be reconciled with a 
judgment that has yet to include the ultimate 
"successful party" determination under subsection 
0). 
**19 We recognize, however, that the plain 
language of subsection (3) does not entirely 
eliminate ambiguity regarding the correct order of 
operation of subsections (1) and (3). We therefore 
also consider legislative history and policy. See 
Stephens, 935 P.2d at 520. We conclude that 
including successful party attorney fees awarded 
under subsection (1) in the subsection (3) 
calculation does not interfere with the policy goals 
behind section 38- 1-18. The preamble to the 
legislature's 2001 amendment indicates that the 
purpose of subsection (3) is to "provide[ ] for costs 
and attorneys' fees in cases where an offer of 
judgment is unreasonably rejected." Ch. 257, 2001 
Utah Laws 1202. As the court of appeals pointed 
out, the legislature's goal in adding subsection (3) 
was to discourage unreasonable rejections of offers 
of judgment. See supra Tf 16. Interpreting the 
"judgment finally obtained" under subsection (3) to 
include an award of attorney fees under subsection 
(1) does nothing to contravene that policy as long as 
the offer of judgment also included attorney fees. 
An offeree who rejects an offer of judgment that 
includes attorney fees and then receives a judgment, 
also including attorney fees, that is greater than the 
offer of judgment clearly has not acted 
unreasonably. 
**20 We are cognizant of the concern expressed 
in the legislative note attached to the 2001 
amendment to section 38-1-18, which the court of 
appeals cited in support of its contrary 
interpretation of the statute's operation. However, 
that concern is largely resolved *359 through the 
use of the flexible and reasoned approach which, we 
concluded above, was proper to determine the 
successful party under subsection (1). Under this 
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approach, a party that makes an outrageous claim 
and then receives only a fraction of what it 
demanded will not likely be deemed the successful 
party. This approach also prevents a party judged 
"successful" from being required to pay attorney 
fees under subsection (3). Although this can create 
something of a winner-takes-all situation when it 
comes to attorney fees, this tendency is effectively 
balanced by the use of the flexible and reasoned 
approach in determining successful party status so 
that no party can expect to be the successful party 
simply because it receives a dollar more than the 
other party. In fact, the flexible and reasoned 
approach was first adopted in order to avoid 
situations such as those mentioned in the legislative 
note, in which the difference of a sum as negligible 
as one dollar could entitle one party to an award of 
attorney fees. Mountain States, 783 P.2d at 557. 
This approach "ensures that only parties that are 
genuinely 'successful1 according to the trial court's 
common sense logic will be able to extract their 
attorney fees from their opponents." Whipple, 2004 
UT47atf25,94P.3d270. 
**21 Finally, we construe statutes to ensure that 
there will be no absurd results, particularly in the 
interplay of subsections of a single statute. See 
Millett, 609 P.2d at 936. Interpreting subsection (3) 
to operate before subsection one would allow a 
party to manipulate section 38-1-18 so as to achieve 
an unfair award of attorney fees. Though there is 
no such allegation here, the present case illustrates 
this potential problem. The Smedsruds' $40,000 
offer of judgment was made on the eve of trial, by 
which time each party had incurred substantial legal 
fees. The offer of $40,000 explicitly included 
attorney fees, but represented less than half the 
amount Pochynok was claiming as damages at trial. 
If we were to hold that the "judgment finally 
obtained" does not include award of attorney fees 
under subsection (1), a party defending against a 
lien could make an offer of judgment, including 
attorney fees, that is well below what is fair for both 
the lien and the attorney fees but that is higher than 
what the other party could hope to win at trial 
exclusive of attorney fees. An interpretation of 
section 38-1-18(3) that does not account for an 
award of attorney fees to the successful party under 
section 38-1-18(1) would too easily allow an offeror 
to benefit by making an unfair offer. 
CONCLUSION 
**22 We uphold the court of appeals' use of the 
flexible and reasoned approach in its review of the 
trial court's determination of the "successful party" 
for purposes of section 38-1-18(1). However, we 
conclude that the trial court could not have made 
this determination without specific information 
regarding the total amount the jury awarded to 
Pochynok and the total amount in offsets it awarded 
to the Smedsruds. Mountain States and Whipple 
clearly contemplate a balancing of awards and 
offsets as part of the flexible and reasoned 
approach. The jury did not provide this information 
in its verdict form. In order to apply the flexible 
and reasoned approach in this case, therefore, the 
trial court should have made findings regarding the 
amounts sought and won by each party. It should 
then have conducted a common sense inquiry and 
balancing in regard to who was the successful party. 
The trial court failed to do so here. 
**23 In addition, we reverse the court of appeals' 
construction of the interplay between subsections 
(1) and (3) of section 38-1-18. We hold that the 
determination of the "successful party" under 
subsection (1) should occur before the calculation 
required under subsection (3) and that any attorney 
fees awarded under subsection (1) should then be 
included in the subsection (3) calculation of 
whether any offer of judgment was greater than the 
judgment finally obtained at trial. 
**24 We remand this case to the court of appeals 
with instructions to remand to the trial court for a 
factual determination of awards and offsets, 
followed by a ruling on who is the successful party 
under Utah Code section 38-1-18(1) and whether an 
award of *360 attorney fees under Utah Code 
section 38-1-18(3) is proper. 
**25 Associate Chief Justice WILKINS, Justice 
DURRANT, Justice PARRISH, and Justice 
NEHRING concur in Chief Justice DURHAM'S 
opinion. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a 
Corporation 
Plaintiff(s), 
vs. 
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN 
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, 
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS, 
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation; 
DIXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation; 
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO 
GRANDE PAINTING, 
Defendant(s). 
OFFER OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 0006000014 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
TO: PLAINTIFF AND COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANT J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, 
INC. AND COUNSEL 
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Code Ann. §38-1-
18(3), defendants and counterclaim plaintiffs, Greg and LouAnn Smedsrud, offer to allow 
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. •• ; ,-.!.•*• -us and Zero Cents 
($40,000.00) incomplete and final seltlemcn: 4 all i lain. *>\ :ho pMiniiff and * mint* - 'aim 
defendant against defendants aiu: « ' - inku iaim plaintills, ureg ana 
plii: M i t i f If ai id eoi iiitei claii i i defei idai it d 3 i lot: accept tl lis offer and fail to obtain a Midi-f,muit at trial 
against defendants and coi mterclaii n plaintiffs which * * TM^C f,i-, .»i;:l)!-- than tins offei. defendai its 
and-counterclaim plaintiffs will seek i eimbursement .-. . . tnepiami . . -.• .._: 
dflriid.iiil in! all ,iili nnrys' Ires and rosls incui i ed after makin :n ^Ur\ pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §38-1-18(3). Evidence of this offer is inadmissible except ii i a proceeding to determine to 
attorneys' fees ai id costs I I lis of Fei ii icludes all clan ns, ii itei est. lie i is, c oi u t c osts ai id attoi neys' 
* . *..
 f
 iintiff and counterclaim defendaiit has made or could against defendants 
and counterclaim ^.untill.^ This offer is in lieu of ai id revokes all prior offers of settlement. . 
MATED tl lis f ^ : dj i) * -*>L. 
JONES, WAI DO, I IOI BROOK & 
MCDONOUGH 
-^v*-^ is^L / ^ ^ ^ g : ^ ^ ^ By 
\\\ rni « Rainplon 
Ross I. Romeii) 
. Attorneys far '• hc^ • id I on inn 
Smedsruci 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Offer of 
Judgment was sent via facsimile and hand delivery, to the following this ^ ^ - d a y o f M a y , 
2002: 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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« * , ***** 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN 
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, 
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS, 
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation; 
DIXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation; 
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO 
GRANDE PAINTING, 
Defendants and Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs. 
JURY VERDICT 
02.01 ol3z? 
Civil No. 0006000011' 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
We, the jury, duly empaneled in the above-entitled matter, hold as follows in the above-
entitled action: 
538370vl 
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1# Based on the law as il ha1. IM-I HI nplainnl in in , \y\ mini in LIVOI ol pjiiiniill m 
Pochynok Company, Inc., and against defendants Gregory .and LouAnn Smedsrud, in the amount 
-n 3:0?(P^A 
2. Basedon the lawas it hnsbmn'xpl.um J li> .- dm! mi In u of 4 h luhiiil, 
Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud, and against plaintiffs J. Pochynok Company, Inc., In the 
amount of $
 : _ . 
DATED this 'J-.X~ dayofM;iv, "in' 
1
 *y^sy/l/si l/fatsifrt*. 
- Jury Foreperson ' 
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IMAGED 
'SMBSBW.r 
VINCENT C. RAMPTON (USB #2684) 
ROSS I. ROMERO (USB #7771) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud 
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 ... 
Telephone: (801)521-3200 
%. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN 
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, 
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS, 
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation; 
DIXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation; 
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO 
GRANDE PAINTING, 
Defendants and Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs. 
DATE 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS J ENTS 
JUDGMENT UPON VERDICT AND 
ORDER ON POST TRIAL MOTIONS 
ozoqotezi 
Civil No. -009600001^ 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
This matter was tried to a jury on May 21 and 22,2002. Prior to trial, all crossclaims 
between defendants Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud and Pella Products, Inc. had been dismissed 
with prejudice pursuant to stipulation and prior order of this Court. In addition, all claims of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc. against defendants Blaze Whar 
Jeffrey Kaiser were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice pursuant 10 K ule 4 i (a), t -lai* Rule-
of ( 'ml I'micdurc prim lim Until 
On May 22,2002, the jury 'returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff J. Pochynok v^uinp - -
Inc. and against Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud, in the amount of $ 7 , 0 7 6 . ^ Tlv- iu? y 
iiiiiiinn ii no vcniiel in illiivni oil ain HIIIMT puily l irnlo • ' ' •'  • . ' -• 
Following trial, both parties- submitted motions tor award of costs and attorneys fees 
incurred u the aa iw m addition, uic plaiuliil submitted a motion for injunctive relief, askinr 
• \s ^n* * Ycilarul, Ku:l V. Nesseth and Locus Architecture, Ltd., by reason of Mr. Yelland 
/ having agreed to appear and testify at ti ial liei ein 
The Court having reviewed the parties'' post ti ial mo tic ns and suppoi ting siibiit i f I „ 11 s 
• being fully advised, and good cause appearing, 
II IS HKKHMYORDMRI'h, adjudged i m i M a i c a l us Inllovvs: • ' ' ' 
1. The motion of Defendants Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud to tax costs and 
attorneys fees is granted for those reasons set out in defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support 
of Motion to Fax Costs .mil 'illnmi y, I n". , 11 N I Ihnit I'cph l\li IIIKH imlum mi Suppml ml IMnlii ill 
to Tax Costs and Attorneys Fees. 
2. Plaintiff . Minimi I >i iiijiiiiciiic Kdicl is denied, lor niose reasons set out in 
•defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion foi Injuncth c • R elief. 
548588v1 n 
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3. Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs is denied for those 
reasons set out in defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Award of 
Attorneys Fees and Costs, defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Tax Costs 
and Attorneys Fees, and their Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Tax Costs and 
Attorneys Fees. 
4. Based upon the foregoing rulings and upon the jury verdict in this matter, final 
judgment is hereby entered as follows: 
a. Judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc., and 
against defendants Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud, jointly and 
severally, in the amount of $7,076.56, together with interest thereon from and 
after May 22, 2002 until paid in full at the contract rate of 12% per annum. 
b.; Judgment is hereby entered in favor of defendants Gregory and LouAnn 
Smedsrud, jointly and severally, and against plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc., 
in the following amounts: 
i. $1,906.94, representing defendants' costs of suit incurred prior to 
. May9,2002; 
ii. $48,083.10, representing defendants' attorneys fees incurred prior 
toMay9,2002; 
ill. $766.50, representing defendants' costs of suit incurred on and 
after May 9,2002; 
548588vl -3-
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i v. ij3,280.00, representing defendants1" attorneys fees incurred on 
and after May 9, 2002; and 
• ' - ' v. Intcresl on the liiiq»oii)|» ..iiiioiiiilLs IMHII >inil .ilfti IMay J1 !, i(MI2 
• • ;}f. ... until paid in full, at the contract rate of 12" o. • • •' • 
c. • It is further ordered that the award of defendants'costs and attorneys fees 
ns STI out iiliuvi: itiiiry Uv iitipjiinilnl in mill rt|ii<il lu .nil i osls citiii .illnii) y11. 
ices wii urred hv defendants' from and dih i Inn* M- ) ,n the enibrcui*wiil 
and ... uv>iicL-lh*ii •
 4i». -mlgment entered i.i'iUi nvn rurther application i^ 
5. I'Jajt1.'! i # s petition loi <m order of foreclosure of us mechanic's hen heir: - ^ 
denied. asitsju* -j . • . , i .. he owners ,. ;.. . . *...
 luupncnl .;i ,<v 
Smedsruds herein. 
6. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to i elease all liens and notices of liens placed by or for 
i( II|HIII mill Smedsi'i'l' indwirc loi jlr d »»'Sii'»'iinM 'Hiitty S'.ilt • ' " 'l.ih !iiui«; pajlirularly 
described as follows: •"•.•>>•' 
A1J o f L o t 1 j ^  p l N E R I D G E S U B D I Y I S I 0 N J a c c o rdi ng t o the 
official plat thereof filed in the office of the Recorder of Summit 
County, State of Utah. 
(hereafter "Smedsrud Property"), Plaintiff is hereby declared u *\nlv no n^hi * Ac or interev,:_ 
ami lo llir Snietlsiiiil hopnlv. IM.IIIIIIII i'> further ordered lo - lease anvand „ ,.jikv.s - t Lis 
548588vl 4 
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Pendens filed against the Smedsrud Property with the Summit County Recorder's office in 
connection with this action. 
7. Defendants Butterfield Lumber, Inc., Pella Products, Inc., Blaze Wharton 
Construction, Inc., Dixie Woodworks, Inc., and Jeffrey Kaiser, having failed to present any proof 
to the court in support of any claims which they have or may have against any party hereto, or to 
obtain any verdict or judgment in their favor, are determined to hold no right, title or interest in 
and to the Smedsrud Property, whether jointly or severally, by virtue of any right of mechanic's 
lien asserted by or on behalf of said defendants (or any of them) against the Smedsrud Property. 
Said defendants are hereby ordered to release all liens and notices of mechanics' or 
materialman's lien placed by or for them upon the Smedsrud Property. 
8. Any and all claims asserted by or against any party to this action, to the extent not 
otherwise addressed in this judgment and order, are hereby deemed dismissed with prejudice and 
on the merits. 
DATED this l^f day of August, 2002. 
BY THE COURT 
548588vl -5-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the . "'"'• day of August, 2002,1 caused to be hand-delivered ;-
ORDER ON POST TRIAL MOTIONS to the following: 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Brett D. Cragun 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Scott L. Wiggins 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS 
American Plaza II, ste. I OS 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Randall R. Smart 
Snow, Nuffer 
341 South Main Street, #303 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 /: 
Ralph R. Tate 
4625 South 2300 East, Ste. 206 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
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Vincent C. Rampton (USB #2684) 
Ross I. Romero (USB #7771) 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud 
170 South Main Street, Suite #1500 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801)521-3200 
By 
FILED BSOTCT CGUSli 
Third Judicial District 
MAR G 3 2006 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN 
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, 
INC.; PELLA PRODUCTS, INC., a 
corporation; BLAZE WHARTON 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a corporation; DIXIE 
WOODWORKS, INC., a corporation; and 
JEFREY KAISER, dba RIO GRANDE 
PAINTING, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE COSTS 
AND ATTORNEYS FEES 
-*- OZP60. 
Civil No. 020901328 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Pursuant to directive of the Utah Supreme Court by Opinion dated June 24,2005, the Court 
enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with respect to its award of costs and 
attorneys fees to Defendants Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud ("Smedsruds") in the above-
. , , Smedsruds* Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
«mtkd utter. ' — • • • • • • • ! 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'.
 :
 •  • '• :•:-..• : ' F I N D I N G S O F F AC I 
1. . ' This matter was tried to a jury on May 21 and 22, 2002. ' .. • • 
= ' 2i .•• F PudniioR ( ompany liu (' Plaintiff ' ) had filed a complaint against Gregory Smeduml 
a i d Lou Ann Smedsrud ("Smedsruds") to foreclose a mechanic's lien asserted foi work allegedly 
performed to the Smedsruds' residence located at 7100 Canyon Road in Summit County, State of IJtal i 
County Recorder 's office on October 19, 1999, in the amount of $74360 .51 , together with interest, $100 
in costs and attorneys' fees. See Exhibit 1 hereto 
Defendants' protu- i> on Jul} 2o, 1999 in the amount ui $i,>u,UU0, plus interest, cost* and a t t u i i u ^ 
fees See Exhibit 2, 
5. Plaintiff also brought claims against 1:1 IC Smedsruds for bKNU'h of a mlim'1 iimil i|iMiitm 1 1 
meruit. 
^ • • 6 . IlliHi Siiioclsilids uHJiitm liiininml .is Ailing d e l a i n e i*oikiiMiisliip iinil Liiliin In iumplck 
the project. . 
7. Pella Products, Inc had asserted a crossclaim against Smedsrud; this, howevei , had been 
(IIMIII.SSI'II vi ilh |in IIKIHI" pur II.IIII In stiipul ilmn JIIHI pi mi mill 1 4 lllii ( "null, 
8. In addition., all claims of Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc. against Defendants Blaze 
Wharton Construction, Inc. and Jcllrcy Kaiser were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice pursuant *~ 
Rule 41(a), Utah Rules of Civil h w n l i 
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9. At trial, Plaintiff asserted a claim against Defendants in the amount of $81,269.91 
(exclusive of costs and attorneys'fees). 
10. Plaintiff offered inconsistent calculations, however, for money allegedly owed in the 
computation of its claim. Specifically, documentary evidence was introduced at trial showing 
inconsistent demands by Plaintiff for payment. 
11. In addition, evidence was introduced that Plaintiff had filed the July 26,1999 notice of 
mechanics' lien against Smedsruds' residence at a time when significant draw requests had recently been 
paid. 
12. Smedsruds presented evidence challenging Plaintiffs accounting work, and establishing 
that Plaintiffs claim at trial, and its second notice of mechanics' lien, were excessive. 
13. Smedsruds also presented evidence that they were entitled to significant offsets for 
unearned supervisor fees, work defects and delays. Specifically, Smedsruds presented evidence that 
a. Paint work had been double charged, resulting in overcharge of $23,087.07; 
b. Plaintiffs contractor fee on the paint work overcharged was likewise unwarranted, 
resulting in an overcharge of $2,308.71; 
c. Smedsruds had been subjected to unwarranted delay costs of $3,118.75; and 
d. Plaintiffs lien had been overstated, permitting offset in an amount equal to twice the 
overcharge amount, which Smedsruds placed at $ 11,535.96. 
14. Smedsruds further produced evidence that they had never received a consistent 
accounting from Plaintiff despite nearly three years of negotiations and attempts, contradictory and 
inconsistent claims coming from Plaintiff right up to the eve of trial. Had Plaintiff been willing to Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
discuss a consistent claim in light of Defendants' demands and offsets, the case would not have gone to 
trial; absent a cogent accounting, though, Defendants had no choice but to submit the matter for a jury to 
decide 
15. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of Plaintiff 
in the amount of only $7,076.56. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. With respect to an award of costs and attorneys fees to the "successful party'* in this 
action, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1), this Court is charged with applying a "flexible and 
reasoned approach" to the parties' relative successes in establishing their claims at trial - AK&R Whipple 
Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construction, 2004 Utah 47, ffl 25-26, 94 P.3d 270. 
2. At trial, Plaintiff asserted claims exceeding $81,000; Smedsruds, however (1) challenged 
the propriety of Plaintiff s accounting and claim, and (2) asserted an offset claim of $40,050.49, together 
with accrued judgment interest. 
3. As such, Plaintiff recovered on only a small fraction of its original claim, which was 
reduced by a factor even greater than the dollar amount of Smedsruds' claimed offsets. 
4. The trial court found Smedsruds' challenge to Plaintiffs claim, coupled with their 
asserted offsets, more persuasive than Plaintiffs offered evidence in support of its claim. 
5. The trial court was further persuaded that, had Plaintiff offered an accurate accounting to 
Smedsruds, trial by jury might have been averted. 
6. Under these circumstances, the court concludes that Smedsruds obtained a comparative 
victory, considering what total victory would have meant for each of the parties. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7. The court further concludes that Smedsruds obtained a full percentage of their claimed 
offsets. 
8. Accordingly, the court concludes that Smedsruds were the "successful party" at trial, for 
purposes of Utah Code Ann. §38-1-18(1). 
9. In light of the foregoing, the court affirms its prior award of costs and attorneys fees to 
Smedsruds, and its prior denial of costs and attorneys fees to Plaintiff. 
10. In light of the foregoing, the court likewise reaffirms its award of Smedsruds' costs and 
attorneys fees incurred after May 9, 2002, pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 38-1-18(3), given that 
Smedsruds' May 9,2002 Offer of Judgment was greater than Plaintiffs actual recoveiy at trial, with or 
without an award of costs and attorneys fees under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1), 
X 11. The court therefore reaffirms its judgment upon verdict and order on post-trial motions 
entered August 15, 2002, as that order and judgment may hereafter be supplemented in the amount of 
any post-judgment costs and attorneys fees incurred by Smedsruds as may hereafter be established by 
affidavit. 
DATED this / - " c l ay of March, 2006 
BYT] 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27lh day of February, 2006,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Brett D. Cragun 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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